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A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to 
environmental regulation   
Karine Nyborgψ and Kjetil Telleζ1 
Abstract 
It has often been claimed that firms’ compliance to environmental regulations is higher than predicted 
by standard theory, a result labeled the “Harrington paradox” in the literature. Enforcement data 
from Norway presented here appears, at first glance, to confirm this “stylized fact”: Firms are 
inspected less than once a year, detected violators are seldom fined, but still, serious violations seem 
relatively rare. However, at a closer look, the paradox dissolves: Enforcement of minor violations is 
lax, but such violations do flourish; serious violations are more uncommon, but such violations are 
subject to credible threats of harsh punishment. This seems quite consistent with predictions from 
standard theory. Although our finding may of course apply to Norway only, we argue that the 
empirical existence of the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the literature. Hence, the 
claim that firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is higher than predicted by standard 
theory should be viewed with skepticism. 
Keywords: Environmental performance, compliance, enforcement, Harrington paradox 
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1. Introduction 
According to Gary Becker’s (1968) theory of rational crime, a profit-maximizing firm 
will comply with an environmental regulation only as long as the expected penalty of 
violating exceeds the compliance cost. On this background, economists have been puzzled by 
evidence seeming to indicate that firms comply to a much higher degree than predicted by this 
theory. Harrington (1988, p.29) summarized this phenomenon in the following three 
statements:  
(i) For most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low. 
(ii) Even when violations are discovered, fines or other penalties are 
rarely assessed in most states. 
(iii) Sources are, nonetheless, thought to be in compliance a large part 
of the time. 
Harrington’s three statements appear to be at odds with the theory of rational crime: If 
the probability that a violator gets punished is low, why would any firm bother to comply at 
all? This description, denoted the “Harrington paradox” by Heyes and Rickman (1999), 
initiated a substantial amount of theoretical work.2  
Harrington’s (1988) paper was mainly theoretical, focusing on optimal enforcement. 
He showed that if the maximum penalty level is restricted, a regulator’s enforcement can be 
made more efficient by dividing firms into groups, contingent on each firms’ past 
performance, and then subject recent violators to a stricter monitoring and sanctioning policy 
than others. His paper was followed by several others, discussing his theory and/or suggesting 
alternative explanations; some examples are Harford and Harrington (1991), Raymond 
                                                 
2 To establish a paradox, it must also be documented that (marginal) compliance costs are large enough to exceed the 
expected value of (marginal) penalties, even if the latter are low. . Systematic and reliable data on firms’ compliance costs 
are generally difficult to obtain. This is an additional reason to doubt that the Harrington paradox can be viewed as an 
empirically established fact.   Below, we will assume that compliance costs are strictly positive and non-negligible.  
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(1999), Heyes and Rickman (1999), Livernois and McKenna (1999), Lai et al. (2003), Decker 
(2003), Heyes (1996), Harford (2000), and Friesen (2003).  
In spite of Harrington’s (1988) theoretical focus, his paper is frequently quoted as 
support for empirical claims that firms’ environmental performance is better than predicted 
from standard theory. Cohen (2000) refers to the Harrington paradox as a “stylized fact”. 
Heyes (2000) calls it one of the “best known empirical ‘results’ in the field”. Harrington’s 
(op.cit.) empirical statements were based on studies of monitoring, enforcement and 
compliance with environmental regulations in the US in the late 1970s/early 1980s, among 
them Russell et al. (1986). Livernois and McKenna (1999) mention some evidence from 
Canada, but without analyzing the data in any depth.3 Apart from this, studies of the empirical 
existence of the Harrington paradox seem to be scarce. Several studies document a rather lax 
enforcement practice in the US and British environmental protection agencies (Hawkins 1984, 
Russell 1990, White 1996, Rechtschaffen 1998). However, it is much less clear that firms’ 
compliance in these cases has been high; indeed, both White (1996) and Russell (1990) report 
quite high violation rates – often far in excess of 50 percent.4  
Several papers in the theoretical literature in fact seem to end up relying only on 
Harrington’s original paper or on his sources as their documentation for the alleged pre-
established empirical existence of the Harrington paradox. For example, Livernois and 
McKenna (1999) and Lai et al. (2003) both quote Russell et al. (1986) and Cropper and Oates 
(1992) on this point; the former of these two papers is Harrington’s (1988) main source, while 
                                                 
3 “Evidence from Statistics Canada shows a similar pattern. Data on industrial compliance rates over the period 1986-1989 
show that six of the nine industrial sectors were in compliance with all monthly pollution standards more than 70 % of the 
time.” (Livernois and McKenna 1999, p. 416.) In a footnote they state that no comprehensive data set exists on 
enforcement activity, but quote data showing that few fines were levied.   
4 See also Earnhart (e.g. 1997, 2000) on environmental performance in the Czech republic under and after the communist 
regime, and Haagensen et al. (1991) on environmental regulations and punishment of violators in the Nordic countries. For 
econometric studies on firms’ responses to the enforcement practices of environmental regulators, see e.g. Magat and 
Viscusi (1990), Deily and Gray (1991), Gray and Deily (1996), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), Nadeau (1997), and 
Dasgupta et al. (2001). For a survey of the literature on monitoring and enforcement, see Cohen (2000). 
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the latter contains no independent empirical evidence and just refers back to Harrington 
(1988)5.  
In the current paper, we present Norwegian data on enforcement and compliance which, at 
first glance, appears to confirm the existence of a Harrington paradox: Inspections of permit 
holding firms are performed less frequently than once a year; criminal penalties are imposed 
upon only a marginal proportion of all detected violations; but still, the Norwegian Pollution 
Control Authority6 (NPCA) rarely detects persistent, severe violations. We will argue, 
however, that this way to summarize the data is more misleading than illuminating. When 
looking closely at the detailed information, and taking the nature of the enforcement policy 
into account, the paradox seems to dissolve: Those types of violations that are not sanctioned 
or sanctioned mildly, do indeed occur frequently, while the kind of violations which are faced 
with harsh punishment are seldom observed. The data thus seems quite consistent with the 
theory of rational crime. Although this finding may of course apply only to Norway, and the 
Harrington paradox may certainly exist elsewhere, we believe that the empirical existence of 
the Harrington paradox is not well documented in the literature. Until further research has 
provided more comprehensive evidence, this “stylized fact” should be viewed with 
skepticism. 
2. A sketch of the Norwegian regulatory system 
The main rule of the Norwegian Pollution Control Act7 is that any pollution is prohibited 
unless an explicit permit has been issued. “Pollution” is defined to cover all emissions that 
may cause damage or be disadvantageous to the environment. This wide definition means that 
                                                 
5 Another example is Friesen (2003, p. 72) who relies solely on Harrington (1988) and Livernois and McKenna (1999) when 
stating that “compliance is generally considered to be high, despite low inspection probabilities and small fines”. Russell et 
al. (1986), one of Harrington’s sources, in fact contains evidence of widespread violations.    
6 Statens forurensningstilsyn. 
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at the outset, practically any emission is illegal. The most important general exceptions from 
this main rule are one for transportation and one for “ordinary” pollution from private homes 
and office buildings. However, most firms in manufacturing industries need an emission 
permit to operate legally.8  
The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (NPCA) grants permits and monitors the 
environmental performance of firms. A permit may specify maximum emission levels per unit 
of time or per unit of spill water or production. However, permits also emphasize qualitative 
regulations concerning institutional aspects within the firm: An almost universal requirement, 
for example, is that internal routines and audition systems for environmental surveillance 
must be properly implemented. Violation of such qualitative regulations may not immediately 
influence the environment, but is viewed as increasing the probability that an environmentally 
harmful situation occurs. NPCA appears to place substantial emphasis on monitoring these 
requirements.  
NPCA monitors the environmental performance of operations9. NPCA’s cost of an 
inspection must be covered by the inspected firm, and this cost can be considerable (up to 
about 25 000 euros, Gebyrforskriften 1996). In addition, inspections may inflict substantial 
work on the firm’s own staff.  
Inspections normally focus on routines and general maintenance of equipment rather than 
actual emissions. There are several reasons for this. First, emissions may legally fluctuate 
during a day, week, or year; therefore, to measure emissions at the time of an inspection may 
say little about the firm's actual compliance with the regulations. Second, emissions may be 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Forurensningsloven (1981). 
8 Our description of rules, routines and firm behavior relates to enforcement of the Pollution Control Act in the period 1992-
2002. Firms’ performance as well as NPCA’s enforcement practice have changed considerably since the 1970s (Golombek 
et al. 2000). Time series on violation data may not indicate trends in emission levels, since the requirements specified in 
firms’ emission permits generally change over time. Other laws than the Pollution Control Act will not be considered. 
9 The Pollution Control Act secures wide authorities for the NPCA in its surveillance of compliance with environmental 
regulations; on mere suspicion of violations of environmental regulations, the NPCA is entitled to show up anywhere at 
any time. 
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closely related to the technology used by the firm or the maintenance and condition of the 
abatement equipment. Third, the purpose of the inspections is not only to verify past and/or 
current violations, but also to prevent future environmental damage; and if a firm does not 
comply with the institutional requirements (e.g. maintaining an internal environmental audit 
system) this is believed to increase the probability of such future damages. For the purposes 
of the present paper, it is important to note that any violation of the conditions of the pollution 
permit, including the institutional requirements, is a violation of environmental regulations. 
Breaking institutional requirements makes the firm a violator even if its actual emission levels 
did not exceed emission caps. 
Roughly half of all permit-holding firms are required by the NPCA to submit annual self-
reports on their environmental performance. The operation must deliver a careful report 
containing exact information on emissions, production, energy consumption, violations, etc. 
These reports are legal documents, and a firm may be punished on the information given in 
such a report. Failure to report violations of environmental regulations, or conscious 
misreporting, is a serious crime that may be punished harshly. Below, we will use both 
inspections data and data based on self-reports. 
The maximum criminal penalty for violations of environmental regulations is 15 years of 
imprisonment10. In a criminal trial, fines may also be imposed upon persons or corporations, 
and profits gained through non-compliance may be confiscated11. A criminal penalty (i.e. 
imprisonments or criminal fines) requires investigation by the police, prosecution and a court 
conviction. In cases where imprisonment is not considered, the prosecution authority 
                                                 
10 The Norwegian Criminal Act §152b. 
11 We have used the following translations of Norwegian legal concepts; bot: criminal fine, forelegg: fine in lieu of 
prosecution, tvangsmulkt: coercive fine. 
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normally suggests a fine in lieu of prosecution. If the alleged criminal accepts the fine, the 
case is settled without a trial12. NPCA can initiate prosecution by filing a formal accusation.  
Usually, however, the first thing NPCA does when a violation is detected (or suspected) is 
to mail the firm a warning letter, stating in what ways the firm is believed to be out of 
compliance, indicating the seriousness of the violations, requesting documentation that the 
firm is in compliance within a given deadline, and pointing out the firm’s legal duty to 
comply with the instructions. If a firm provides the requested documentation within the 
deadline, the NPCA will normally take no further action. Violators failing to respond 
adequately to the warning, however, seem to be met by more formal and direct sanctions.13 
Coercive fines or even withdrawal of emission permits are available to the NPCA (without 
prosecution). The use of administrative sanctions has not, at least until recently, been 
considered to rule out criminal sanctions. In practice, NPCA often awaits filing formal 
accusations till informal and administrative sanctions are unsuccessfully exhausted. This 
implies that if a criminal sanction is imposed, the firm will usually already have paid 
(additional) administrative fines. 
3. Inspection frequency and detection probability 
In this section we will see that on average, Norwegian permit holding firms are inspected 
less frequently than once a year. This is even more seldom than what Harrington (1988) 
reports for the US. However, as will become clearer in the following, a low inspection 
frequency need not necessarily imply that the detection probability is low.  
                                                 
12 This is not the "plea bargaining" known from criminal cases in the US. The size of a fine in lieu of prosecution is never 
subject to bargaining, and it is set with regard to the expected outcome of a court conviction. Finally, an acceptance of a 
fine in lieu of prosecution does not require or imply that the accused accepts any guilt. 
13 This appears to be in line with the US EPA practice described by Russell (1990, p. 252): “Many states claim to pursue a 
so-called voluntary compliance policy, by which they mean that no penalties are ordinarily levied for violations initially. 
Rather, if penalties are used, it is to punish sources that refuse to correct violations or otherwise prove notably 
uncooperative.” 
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It is the articulated policy of NPCA that the frequency, thoroughness and focus of an 
inspection vary with firm characteristics. NPCA divides operations with emission permits into 
four risk classes, where the potentially most environmentally harmful operations are put in 
Risk Class 1 and the less potentially harmful operations are placed in Risk Class 4. Potentially 
more risky operations are inspected more frequently and thoroughly than less environmentally 
risky operations. According to the inspection scheme of NPCA firms in Risk Class 1 are 
subjected to thorough inspections every other year and normal (less thorough) inspections 
every other year. Firms in Risk Class 4 are rarely inspected at all. Based on each inspection 
result, NPCA inspection officers make explicit recommendations concerning future inspection 
frequencies. Bad performers may receive a new inspection prior to what follows from the 
inspection scheme for firms in that risk class, and vice versa.14 In cases where the inspector 
found no evidence of violation, but still suspects that something is wrong, he may also record 
a need for more frequent inspections of the firm.  
Table I shows the inspection frequency during the period 1992 – 2000 among permit 
holding firms subject to the self-report requirement15. This includes all firms in Risk Class 1 
and 2, but very few in Risk Class 4 (Walle 2003). Over this whole period 1891 reports where 
submitted. The inspection frequency of the firms submitting reports was .44 per year, i.e. an 
average of one inspection every 27 months. The inspection frequency increases with risk 
class: The potentially most environmentally harmful firms are inspected every 15 months, 
while firms in Risk Class 4 are inspected on average only every 70 months.  
 
(Table I about here) 
 
                                                 
14 Information from the public, environmental organizations, or the police may also initiate a higher than regular inspection 
frequency. 
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Based on data on inspections from 1992 -2002, we performed a regression with the 
number of days till next inspection as the dependent variable (see the appendix for details). 
The results confirm that when NPCA inspectors recommend a higher inspection frequency 
than indicated by the regular scheme, firms are actually being inspected again significantly 
and substantially earlier than other firms in the same risk class. Hence, it is clear that if the 
NPCA receives indications (from inspections, careless self-reporting, the general public, the 
police, or other sources) that a firm may not be complying, the firm will face a higher 
inspection frequency than reported in Table I.  
 Whether inspections are frequent or not is of course a relative question. For example, 
consider the purpose of catching with hot hands someone who pours hazardous liquid into a 
river. Say that he spends five minutes every month doing this, and that after those five 
minutes nothing can be verified. Clearly, for such a purpose an inspection every other year is 
hopelessly infrequent.  
The inspections of the NPCA, however, focus heavily on the functioning and 
maintenance of abatement and auditing equipment, whether the technology is adequately 
implemented, and whether internal routines and auditing systems are implemented as required 
in the permits. For the purpose of monitoring compliance with such regulations, one may not 
need very frequent inspections. NPCA inspectors can spend several days in the firm, 
interviewing any employee, inspecting books and equipment; and through such extensive 
visits it may be very difficult for a firm manager to hide a systematic neglect of institutional 
or equipment-related environmental regulations. Recall that such requirements are not merely 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 See the section on compliance for a closer presentation of the data. The data does not allow calculation of inspection 
frequencies for firms not subject to self-reporting, since we do not know the number of such firms that are not inspected.  
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formalities. They are there to reduce the probability that damage occurs. Hence, a low 
inspection frequency is not necessarily the same as a low detection probability.16 
Harrington (1988) and Russell (1990) distinguish between initial compliance, meaning 
mainly compliance to requirements of installing abatement equipment, and continuous 
compliance, meaning the keeping over time of emission caps. They seem to regard these types 
of compliance as rather independent, and focus on the latter. However, there is a relationship 
between the two: While installing abatement equipment – and probably also establishment of 
sound environmental auditing routines – can be associated with large fixed cost, such 
measures also often reduce the variable abatement costs, and hence the profitability of 
violating emission caps. If so, a firm with the necessary equipment and routines in place will 
be less likely to exceed its emission caps.  
4. Are most firms in compliance? 
In this section, we will use data from inspections and the self-reports to study compliance 
to environmental regulations among Norwegian firms. The data indicates that persistent, 
severe violations are rare. However, this does not mean that most firms are in compliance: 
Most inspections, and even most self-reports, reveal minor violations of some kind. 
Moreover, serious violations are not altogether uncommon, even if they usually do not prevail 
over time after they have been detected.  
4.1. The data 
Any data on compliance must be viewed with a certain skepticism, since firms may have 
incentives to conceal violations. Whether a violation has occurred is also a legal judgment 
                                                 
16 Moreover, the inspections give priority to those firms that are believed to have the largest potential for causing 
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which is to some extent subjective, since this is usually not simply a question on whether 
emission caps are exceeded or not.17 The data presented here are based on the reports filed by 
NPCA’s auditors, as well as firms’ self-reports. After each inspection, and following each 
self-report, NPCA officers file their judgment of whether findings represent a deviation from 
the regulatory requirements, and whether findings justify changes in the inspection frequency 
of the firm. Below, we will use these data as indicators for firms’ compliance. Only firms 
with pollution permits are included, implying that while the potentially most environmentally 
harmful firms are included, many firms with only “ordinary” emissions from transport, 
heating of office building etc. are excluded. The majority of the firms with pollution permits 
are in the manufacturing industries.  
The inspection data set includes 794 different firms with a permit, and covers the period 
from 1992 to 200218. Before 1997, the most important recorded variable for our purpose is the 
inspector’s recommendation concerning future inspection frequency. The NPCA’s routines 
imply that if severe violations are detected, more frequent inspections are usually 
recommended; hence this variable can be used as a rough indicator of the degree of 
compliance. In 1997, however, data quality improved, and from this date on we have direct 
information on whether an inspection revealed violation(s). Since potentially environmentally 
harmful operations and suspected violators are inspected more frequently than other firms, 
such firms are generally overrepresented in the inspection data. NPCA usually focuses on 
some parts of an operation during an inspection, and may thus not discover all violations 
actually present. 
                                                                                                                                                        
environmental damage. This means that those firms, which are most likely to have serious violations, are monitored more 
often than others. 
17 See Bugge (1999). 
18 The data for the year 2002 is likely not to include all inspections performed. On average 2.7 inspections per firm are 
reported during this period. Note, however, that due to factors like entry and exit, some firms will not be included in the 
dataset in every year.  
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The self-reports data set covers 304 different firms over the period from 1992 to 2000. On 
average each firm has submitted 6 reports during this period19. Only firms with a certain 
potential for environmental damage are subject to the self-reporting requirement; hence, more 
environmentally risky operations are overrepresented.20  However, as self-reports are due once 
a year for all firms, irrespective of any suspicions by NPCA, suspected violators are not 
necessarily overrepresented. One must of course keep in mind that firms may report 
untruthfully to the NPCA, even if the punishment for conscious misleading reporting is harsh. 
4.2. Violation frequency 
Since NPCA started to register data on violations in 1997, one or more violations are 
found in about 79 percent of all inspections. This overall violation frequency is relatively 
stable over the years (see Table II).  
Table III shows that the high detection of violations in inspections is not due to many 
inspections in a few notoriously violating firms: 93 percent of the firms inspected at least 
once over the period 1997 – 2002 were registered with at least one deviation. The table 
confirms that a higher prevalence of both violations and major violations in risk classes with 
high environmental risk. Although we know that suspected offenders are monitored more 
often than others, these numbers seem very high.  
NPCA registers violations and categorizes observations in inspections into three classes; 
"no deviations", "deviations" and "major deviations" from the regulations. Major deviations 
were detected in 12 per cent of the inspections (Table II), and were found at least once in 21 
percent of inspected firms during the period 1997 – 2002 (Table III). 
 
                                                 
19 All firms required to submit a report did actually do so. 
20 See Section 3. 
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(Tables II and III about here) 
 
The self-reports indicate much the same pattern of violation as the inspection data. 57 
percent of all self-reports were judged to indicate violations, a number which has increased 
slightly over the period. 14 percent of all self-reports indicate serious violations. These 
numbers are not directly comparable to the inspection data. First, the fact that NPCA inspects 
suspected violators more often, while self-report frequencies are fixed, works in the direction 
of more violations in the inspection sample than in the self-report sample. Second, it may be 
easier to establish a deviation in an inspection than from a report. Third, the reports focus 
more on emissions than the inspections, while inspections focus more on internal routines and 
implementation of equipment. Finally, self-reporting firms consist only of a subset of the 
inspected firms. Nevertheless, violations seem frequent regardless of the data source. 
Since 1992, NPCA has records of officers’ recommendations for future inspection 
frequency following each inspection. Recommendations are one of the following: "Inspect 
less frequently than the regular scheme", "inspect according to the regular scheme", "inspect 
more frequently than the regular scheme", or “consider prosecution". In the latter case, the 
report is forwarded to NPCA’s lawyers. If the inspection did not reveal important deviations, 
the recommendation would usually be to inspect less frequently or as regular, while more 
serious violations would result in one of the two latter recommendations. Figure 1 shows how 
inspection results have been classified from 1992 to 2002. Officers found reason to increase 
the inspection frequency, but without suggesting prosecution, for 10-15 percent of the firms. 
In addition, prosecution was considered as a result of about 3 percent of all inspections from 
1992-2002. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
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4.3. Persisting or successive violations 
If some firms consider their compliance costs to be permanently higher than the expected 
penalties, one would expect that the firm violates the regulation (Becker 1968); and not just 
once, but again and again. It is thus of interest to know whether those firms that violate do so 
repeatedly.  
Table IV focuses on the subset of firms whose audit resulted in one of the 
recommendations "inspect more frequently" or "consider prosecution" at least once. The table 
shows the characterization such firms received in the next inspection, i.e. the first inspection 
following the above characterization.21 In the vast majority of cases, inspector 
recommendations do not express similar degrees of concern in the next inspection. Only one 
firm was considered (once) for prosecution in two successive audits. As much as 76 percent 
of the firms that got one of the two worst characterizations in the previous inspection got one 
of the to best in the successive one. Although these data do not record violations directly, and 
must hence be interpreted with care, the results in Table IV seem to indicate that persistent or 
successive severe violations are uncommon. 
 
(Table IV about here) 
 
Of those firms who submitted a self-report classified as containing "more serious 
deviations", 13 percent received the same classification on their next self-report. This is 
nearly the same as the overall frequency of serious deviations in self-reports (14 percent). For 
38 percent, the next report was classified by “no deviations”; while in the remaining cases, 
deviations were found, but not major ones. Hence, it seems to be the case that firms found to 
be in severe violation of the environmental regulations seldom keep this status over time.  
15 
To conclude, both data sources strongly indicate that most firms violate regulations. 
Indeed, the inspection data indicates that violations abound. Even serious violations are not 
particularly infrequent. However, persistent or successive serious violations seldom occur.  
5. Are observed violators fined? 
Table III shows that the NPCA reveals violations in 79 per cent of the inspections, while 
the data underlying Figure 1 shows that it considers prosecution in only 3 percent of the 
inspections. Table V shows the number of formal accusations actually filed by the NPCA 
over the last years22.  
 
(Table V about here) 
 
Literally all firms being formally accused by the NPCA end up facing criminal 
penalties. In addition to fines, individuals can be sentenced to up to 15 years of imprisonment, 
and excess profits due to violations may be confiscated. Usually cases are settled with fines in 
lieu of prosecution. There have been several examples of fines in the magnitude of several 
hundred thousands euros23. Hence, strict sanctions are available,24 but the data suggests that 
criminal sanctions are seldom assessed. 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 Note that this implies that some firms may be recorded several times in the table.  
22 The figures do not only include accusations according to the Pollution Control Act but also another law surveyed by 
NPCA; hence compared to other data given in this paper, the data in Table V tends to overstate the number of accusations 
filed. 
23 In 2001 a manufacturing plant accepted a fine in lieu of prosecution of more than 0.5 million euros for extensive emissions 
of mercury to a fjord. The year before, an aluminum recycling plant accepted a fine of about 250 thousand euros. In 
addition about 250 thousand euros where confiscated and members of the management where prosecuted for perjury. In 
1997 a man was sentenced to 120 days of imprisonment for pouring an environmentally damaging liquid into a river. 
24 Some of the theoretical studies assume that sanctions sufficiently strict to secure compliance are not available to the 
regulator (Harrington 1988, Heyes and Rickman 1999). In the case of NPCA, sufficiently strict sanctions appear to be 
available, at least formally. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that firms are not actually prosecuted does not necessarily mean 
that they are not faced with a credible threat of harsh punishment. Indeed, according to 
theory, if the expected penalty is sufficiently harsh, and if firms did not make mistakes, we 
would never observe that penalties were levied at all, since no firm would choose to violate. 
Our data shows that firms do violate. However, we also know (see Section 2) that the NPCA 
normally does not prosecute a firm unless it fails to comply after being warned. A firm is thus 
not faced with strict penalties for temporary, minor violations (provided that it demonstrates a 
willingness to cooperate with the NPCA). This is precisely the kind of violations that seem to 
abound. But a firm with major violations, which does not respond adequately to NPCA’s 
warnings, does face a credible threat of prosecution and harsh sanctions. What we observe is 
what we would expect from theory, namely that persistent, major violations are rare.  
Finally, one should note that a firm that violates environmental regulations may face 
criminal, administrative, or informal sanctions. In practice, firms face some economic 
incentives to comply even in the absence of prosecution. Since the firm must cover the 
inspection costs, an increased inspection frequency is costly. Further, when a warning letter is 
received, the firm must provide adequate documentation to the NPCA that it has moved into 
compliance, and this is generally resource demanding for the firm (for example, external 
consultants may need to be hired). In addition, firms may of course fear bad publicity, which 
may not depend on formal prosecution.  
6. Concluding discussion 
Harrington (1988) summarizes the pollution control system in the US in the late 
1970s/early 1980s as one where most firms comply, despite low expected penalties. This 
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apparent puzzle has received much attention by theoretical researchers. However, the 
empirical evidence for this phenomenon is scarce.  
In this paper, we have reported Norwegian data that, at first glance, seems to confirm 
Harrington’s paradox: Inspections are relatively infrequent; few of the detected violators are 
prosecuted; and still, major, persistent violations of the environmental regulations are rare. 
However, at closer scrutiny, our findings appear less paradoxical. The enforcement 
procedures used by the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (NPCA) implies that firms 
almost universally get a second chance before prosecution, in terms of a warning letter. If 
they move into compliance upon receipt of this warning, prosecution is usually not carried 
through; but in the case of repeated or persistent serious violations, or a consistently ignorant 
attitude from the firm’s management, prosecution is not unlikely. Accordingly, assuming 
profit-maximizing behavior, standard theory would predict a lot of minor and/or temporary 
deviations, but few serious and persistent violations. And this is precisely the pattern that we 
observe. In fact, almost 80 percent of all inspections reveal some kind of deviation from the 
requirements of the firm’s pollution permit. 
Although the use of warnings may seem to imply an unnecessarily lax enforcement 
practice, there are also several arguments in favor of warnings. Whether a policy of warnings 
before prosecution is rational from the regulator’s point of view is outside the scope of this 
paper, however.25 Nevertheless, note that this policy bears some resemblance to the 
enforcement practice recommended by Harrington (1988), which implies that persistent 
violators should be subject to stricter enforcement than others.     
Our data is concerned with the situation in Norway. The Harrington paradox, termed a 
“stylized fact” by Cohen (2000), may of course still provide an adequate description of the 
                                                 
25 In Nyborg and Telle (2003) we show that if prosecution is costly to the regulator, there may be multiple equilibria in the 
economy, including one with very low compliance and one with very high compliance; and under certain conditions, 
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situation in other countries. However, as noted in the introduction, the empirical evidence of 
this seems to be very scarce. Moreover, important features of the Norwegian enforcement 
scheme, such as the practice of giving warnings, seem to be shared by environmental 
protection agencies in other countries as well (see e.g. Hawkins 1984, Harrington 1988, or 
Rechtscaffen 1998). If the enforcement policy in use implies, for example, that minor, 
temporary violations are hardly sanctioned at all, while major, persistent violations are faced 
with credible threats of harsh punishment, then in order to test a hypothesis that firms comply 
to a larger extent than predicted by theory, one needs data that distinguishes between these 
two types of violation. The data provided in Livernois and McKenna (1999), for example, is 
much to aggregated to allow such distinctions. In the absence of additional empirical 
evidence, the claim that firms comply with environmental regulations to a surprisingly high 
degree should be viewed with sound skepticism.       
 
                                                                                                                                                        
warnings will then reduce the probability that the economy switches from the high compliance equilibrium to the low 
compliance equilibrium. 
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Appendix 
The regression was performed on the following random effect panel model with individual effects: 
itiitiit ucharacterInspectionclassRiskInterceptinspectionnexttillDays εγβ ++++= _____ , 
where i is the firm index, t is the number of the actual inspection of a given firm, Risk_class is a vector 
of risk class dummies, Inspection_character is a vector of inspection character dummies, u is the 
random disturbance characterizing firm i, and ε is the random disturbance. 
The vector Risk_class comprises of two elements: “Risk Class 2” and “Risk Class 3 or 4” are 
set to one if the firm belongs to Risk Class 2, or 3 or 4, respectively; zero otherwise. The vector 
Inspection_character comprises of one element: “Inspect more frequent” is set to one if the inspector’s 
recommendation is “inspect more frequent than regular” or “consider prosecution” (inspection 
recommendations are elaborated on in Section 4)26; zero otherwise27. 
The unbalanced panel (firms with only two inspections are excluded) comprises of i=1,..,306 
firms and t=1,..,47 inspections of one firm. Altogether there are 1186 observations. 
 
Coefficient of… Parameter estimate  p-value 
Intercept 493 <.0001 
Dummies (set to one if...)   
    Risk Class 2 286 <.0001 
    Risk class 3 or 4 553 <.0001 
    Inspect more frequent than regular -241 <.0001 
 
Table AI: Results from a regression explaining the number of days till the firm was inspected again 
with dummies for risk class and inspection characterization. Data source: NPCA (2003).  
                                                 
26 Note that “inspect more frequent” refers to the regular scheme of the NPCA for inspection frequency of firms in a given 
risk class, and not to the actual historical inspection frequency of firm i. Endogeneity problems could occur in the 
regression model if e.g. the history of environmental performance makes NPCA move the firm to another risk class. 
However, the main criterion for putting a firm in a specific risk class is the environmental risk of the operation when the 
permit is issued. 
27 These qualitative results are robust against a separation of “Risk class 3 or 4” into two separate dummies, or “Inspect more 
frequent” into two separate dummies. They are also robust against a two-way random effect specification, where a random 
disturbance characterizing inspection number t of the firm is included. Further, the estimated coefficient (and standard 
deviation) of “Inspect more frequent” remains very similar under both a one way and a two way fixed effect specification. 
A hypothesis of no fixed effects can be rejected (F-test, p<.001). A random effect model may be preferred to the fixed 
effect model (a Hausman test of the hypothesis that individual effects are uncorrelated with the other independent variables 
in the model cannot be rejected, p>0.36). 
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 Risk class 
 Total 1 2 3 4 
Number of self-reports from different 
firms28 
1891 459 479 924 29 
Number of inspections  839 361 216 257 5 
Mean inspection frequency per year .44 .79 .45 .28 .17 
 
Table I: Inspection frequency for firms that submit compulsory annual reports 1992-2000. 
Data source: NPCA (2003) and NPCA (2001). 
                                                 
28 A few firms hold multiple permits and must submit multiple self-reports. 
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 1997-
2002 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of inspections 878 185 153 127 172 144 97 
Per cent of inspections with 
deviation(s) 
79 77 80 78 84 79 77 
Per cent of inspections with 
major deviation(s) 
12 15 12 8 12 14 11 
 
Table II: Observations of deviations from the regulations in inspections of permit holding 
firms. Data source: NPCA (2003). 
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 Risk Class29 
 All 1 2 3 4 
Number of inspected firms 415 84 77 202 46 
Per cent of inspected firms 
with at least one deviation 
93 100 95 91 87 
Per cent of inspected firms 
with at least one major 
deviation 
21 35 25 16 11 
 
Table III: Inspected firms’ observed deviations over the period 1997-2002. Data source: 
NPCA (2003). 
 
 
                                                 
29 Data on the firm’s risk class was missing for 6 firms.  
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 Percent with given inspector recommendation in the successive 
inspection  
Inspector 
recommendation of 
previous inspection  
"consider 
prosecution" 
"inspect more 
frequently" 
"inspect less 
frequently" or 
"inspect as regular" 
"consider prosecution" 2 16 82 
"inspect more 
frequently" 
4 22 74 
"consider prosecution" 
or "inspect more 
frequently" 
3 21 76 
 
Table IV: Inspector recommendations in the first inspection following an inspection resulting 
in the recommendations "consider prosecution" or "inspect more frequently", 1992-2002. 
Data source: NPCA (2003). 
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1998 1999 2000 2001 
5 5 7 17 
 
Table V: Number of formal accusations filed by the NPCA. Source: NPCA (2002).  
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Figure 1: Characterization of inspections of permit holding firms. Data source: NPCA (2003). 
 
